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I. INTRODUCTION
Court-connected mediation has become a common feature of courts
throughout the United States. While litigation and mediation are separate and
distinct processes, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Court-
connected mediation operates within the context of ongoing litigation, and
anything that takes place in the case before it is sent to mediation impacts the
mediation process. For example, information derived from the discovery
phase of litigation is used in mediation to clarify issues, evaluate risks, and
formulate strategies for negotiations.1
Similarly, the filing of motions in a case before mediation also changes
the dynamics of the mediation process. The parties move to a position of
entitlement as to the issues raised in the motions, the intensity of the conflict
between the parties escalates, bargaining positions harden, and negotiation
strategies shift. How the court deals with these motions further has an impact
on the mediation process and may influence the mediation outcome.
Some courts rule on the pending motions before engaging in mediation;
others go ahead and send cases to mediation in the hopes of avoiding the
motions. Although individual cases present their own reasons for taking one
course of action or the other, mediation and economics literature both
suggest that mediation settlement rates will be higher if courts routinely rule
on pending motions before sending cases to mediation. This paper will
review that literature to construct a theoretical basis for the hypothesis, and
then put the hypothesis to an empirical test.
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1 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 571 (6th ed. 2003).
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II. BACKGROUND
Mediation is an ancient dispute resolution process that has historically
operated independently of the courts.2 Its use as a tool of court administration
is a fairly recent development, inspired by Roscoe Pound's blistering speech
to the American Bar Association in 1906. 3
Pound noted widespread public dissatisfaction with the administration of
justice rooted in the persistent perception that courts are overloaded and
inefficient.4 He is certainly not the first to voice this concern; literature
throughout history has graphically portrayed the injustice of slow justice.
Shakespeare, Dickens, and even the Bible echo the theme that justice delayed
is justice betrayed. 5 Pound went on to denounce archaic legal philosophies
and practices that fritter away valuable court time, and called for a
comprehensive reform of the American justice system.6
In 1976, a group of legal scholars, judges, and leaders of the bar, calling
themselves the Pound Conference, met in the very room where Pound had
spoken, to closely examine contemporary concerns about the efficiency and
fairness of court systems, as well as to chart a course for improvement. 7 One
of the initiatives coming out of the Pound Conference was the use of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) forums. 8
The ADR movement got off to a slow start in part because many courts
considered that they already had an effective "ADR" system in place. This
2 ALAN ScoTr RAU ET AL., MEDIATION AND OTHER NON-BINDING ADR PROCESSES
1-3 (3d ed. 2006).
3 ROSCOE POUND, THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1906), reprinted in THE POUND CONFERENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 337 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds.,
1979) [hereinafter Pound Conference].
4 See HECTOR Ftx-FIERRO, COURTS, JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY 1-14 (2003).
5 See, e.g., Luke 18:1-8; CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1853); WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 1.
6 Pound Conference, supra note 3, at 343-351.
7 See American Bar Association, Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task
Force, 74 F.R.D. 159 (1976); William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference
Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76
F.R.D. 277 (1978); Griffen D. Bell, The Pound Conference Follow-Up: A Response from
the United States Department of Justice, 76 F.R.D. 320 (1978).
8 Pound Conference, supra note 3. See Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A
Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83 (1976), for the major addresses delivered
at the conference. Special emphasis was placed on alternative, non-judicial means of
dispute resolution. Id.; see also, Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70
F.R.D. 111 (1976).
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"ADR" system consisted of direct negotiations between the parties and
resulted in more than 90% of all cases being settled before trial.9 The
problem with this system was that results were too slow and too expensive,
and the process was too stressful. Cases usually settled when the cost of
litigation accrued to the point that there was little to be gained from trial.' 0
Needless to say, this system did nothing to alleviate the widespread public
dissatisfaction with the courts. By 1986, mushrooming caseloads and a
public outcry for change prompted courts across the country to initiate pilot
ADR programs. "1 Since then, the ADR movement has picked up steam and
drawn wide public attention. ADR mechanisms have been established
throughout the United States with court-connected programs in both state and
federal courts. 12
Mediation is, by far, the most popular of the ADR techniques used in
court programs today.' 3 Court-connected mediation differs from other types
of mediation in that it takes place under the auspices of the law.14 A referral
to mediation does not diminish the importance of the law, but rather gives the
parties access to an alternative process that may save them time and money
while remaining under the careful supervision of the court. 15
III. MEDIATION
Mediation is premised on the philosophy that any agreement voluntarily
arrived at by the parties through a process of cooperation and compromise is
a more productive resolution of their conflict than a judgment imposed by a
court as the product of an adversarial process in which one party is declared
the winner and the other the loser.16 The parties will be better satisfied and,
more likely abide by an agreement of their own creation. 17 In mediation, the
parties attempt to resolve their dispute collaboratively with the help of a
9 Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARv. L. REV. 668, 670 (1986).
10 1d.
I1 Id. at 669-70.
12 Id. at 668.
13 Douglas A. Henderson, Mediation Success: An Empirical Analysis, 11 OHIO ST. J.
ON DisP. RESOL. 105, 128-32 (1996).
14 Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through
Law, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 47, 65 (1996).
15 Edwards, supra note 9, at 673.
16 RAU ET AL., supra note 2, at 11-12.
17 Id. at 12.
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neutral third party, referred to as "the mediator." 18 The mediator attempts to
separate the people from the problem by helping the parties focus on their
respective interests (as opposed to their legal rights), explore alternatives that
satisfy their needs, and construct a consensual resolution of the issues. 19
The mediator has no decisionmaking authority, but controls the process
and acts as a facilitator of communications between the parties.20 The
mediator's role varies with the circumstances of the individual case and the
goals to be accomplished. 21 The mediator often acts as an encourager, a
generator of possible solutions, a reality tester, and a shuttle diplomat who
obtains and distributes private information to help focus on areas of
agreement without the risks of face-to-face confrontation by the parties.22
The mediator helps the parties clarify the risks of litigation, explore probable
trial outcomes, and define their best alternative to a negotiated settlement. 23
The parties are empowered, by the very nature of the mediation process,
to confront each other on both a moral and a personal level.2 4 The parties are
encouraged to focus on their real interests rather than contrived legal
positions, view the conflict from various perspectives, and participate in the
process in good faith.25 The very act of participating in the mediation process
alters the existing dynamics between the parties. By requiring the parties to
hear each other's justifications and confront each other's feelings, mediation
helps the less powerful party invoke shared community standards. 26 The
ultimate objective is to bring the parties to a mutual acceptance of
community standards of fairness and broad equity that might not be possible
in an adversarial proceeding. 27 The strength of mediation is that it permits the
parties to achieve their own dynamic resolution rather than being bound by a
superimposed and inflexible legal solution. 28
1 8 ROBERT J. NIEMAC ET AL., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR
128 (2001).
1 9 ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING To YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIvING IN 21-29 (2d ed. 1991).
20 RAU ET AL., supra note 2, at 14.
21 Id. at 12.
22 Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayers, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA.
L. REv. 323, 324-25 (1994).
23 Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (1995).
24 RAU ET AL., supra note 2, at 13.
25 NIEMAC ET AL., supra note 18, at 63.
2 6 RAU ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-13.
2 7 Id. at 13.
28 Id. at 12.
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IV. TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE COASE THEOREM
In order to reach this dynamic resolution, the parties must first overcome
the barriers that caused negotiations to stall and litigation to be filed. In
economics literature, these barriers are referred to as transaction costs.29
Transaction costs include any and all impediments to bargaining.30 Some
transaction costs are directly financial in nature, such as the cost of preparing
for negotiations, hiring representatives, and obtaining information.31 Some
are indirectly financial, such as the time spent in negotiations. 32 Other
transaction costs are psychological in nature; for example: (1) anger; (2)
emotional investment in the case; (3) risk-taking tendencies; (4) reluctance to
share information, making it difficult for each side to determine the strength
of the other side's case and to gauge a realistic range of settlement; (5)
reluctance to suggest a settlement range for fear of looking weak; (6)
positional bargaining in which each party refuses to move far from his best
case scenario without a perceived reciprocal movement from the other side;
(7) overly optimistic estimates of the probability of achieving the best case
scenario; (8) incentive of attorneys and other agents to continue litigation; (9)
nonproductive negotiation strategies; (10) need for vindication or an apology
from the other; (11) overemphasis on the "principle" involved; and (12)
righteous indignation, to name just a few.33
The Coase Theorem holds that if transaction costs are zero, the parties
will always recognize the advantages of reaching an agreement. 34 Each party
will be led by the "invisible hand" to the point that would be achieved by the
ideal merger between the parties.35 This solution will be reached regardless
of how the law assigns property rights because there are no barriers hindering
negotiations, and both parties have the same incentive to choose the most
efficient result.36
Since transaction costs include all impediments to bargaining, there can
never be a situation in which transaction costs are actually zero; just getting
the parties together to talk involves transaction costs.37 The Coase Theorem
29 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 85-95 (4th ed. 2004).
30 Id. at 89.
31 Id. at 88.
32 Id. at 91-94.
33 POSNER, supra note 1, at 575-77.
34 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
35 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 29, at 87.
36 Id. at 89.
37 Coase, supra note 34, at 7-8.
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does not require transaction costs to be absolutely zero for the parties to
reach an agreement; it just requires that transaction costs be less than what is
at stake. 38 Transaction costs need to be low enough for the parties to
recognize a mutual gain from cooperation: the lower the transaction costs,
the more likely this is to occur. 39
Whether mediation is able to induce settlement depends largely on its
ability to mitigate these transaction costs. The mediation process, through its
use of a neutral third party mediator, is particularly adept at doing this. The
mediator brings the parties together, establishes a constructive ambience for
negotiation, collects confidential information from each side, and judiciously
communicates selected portions of that confidential information. 40 The
mediator always allows the parties to work out their own solutions while
helping them clarify their values, deflate unreasonable claims, loosen
commitments, seek joint gains, keep negotiations going, and articulate the
rationales for agreement. 41
A case will settle in mediation only if both parties perceive that, all
things considered, an agreement would increase their welfare. The Coase
Theorem predicts that this will happen regardless of the legal assignment of
property rights when transaction costs are low, but by specifying when an
assignment of property rights is not important, the Coase Theorem implies
when an assignment of property rights is important-when transaction costs
are high.42 The very fact that a case is in litigation indicates that transaction
costs are already high, and the mediation process adds its own transaction
costs to the mix. So, the corollary to the Coase Theorem holds that when
transaction costs are high enough to prevent private bargaining, the efficient
use of resources will depend on how property rights are assigned. 43
Litigation can be viewed as the cost of defining how property rights are
assigned. Once the assignment of property rights have been defined, the
parties may then be able to negotiate to their mutual advantage. 44 The
property rights that need to be defined are identified when the parties file
motions and responses to motions. The contested motions represent
competing claims to specific property rights. By ruling on the pending
3 8 Id.
39 Id.
40 POSNER, supra note 1, at 567.
41 Id.
42 COoTER & ULEN, supra note 29, at 89.
43 Id.
44 Alex Robson & Stergios Skaperdas, Costly Enforcement of Property Rights and
the Coase Theorem, 36 ECON. THEORY 109, 110 (2008).
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motions before sending cases to mediation, the court, in effect, makes an
assignment of these property rights, and once these property rights have been
assigned, the parties will be able to explore whether there are still gains to be
achieved through cooperation. While this is not a guarantee of settlement, it
is an indication that the parties now have something to talk about.
V. HYPOTHESIS
Cases in which the court rules on pending motions before mediation are
more likely to reach a mediated settlement than those cases in which the
court does not rule on pending motions.
A. Methodology
Because the literature review of the mediation process shows that there
are many barriers to reaching settlement in mediation, an unobtrusive
research method was chosen in order to avoid the danger that the research
itself would add to transaction costs. The data was collected by searching
archival case file records.
Archival Research and Content Analysis: The units of analysis in this
project were court case files of public record.
Sampling Frame: The units of observation were cases that were
mediated through the court-connected program of the Civil Division of the
Fulton County, Georgia, Superior Court from January 1, 2005 through
December 31, 2008. The Civil Division of the Superior Court is the trial
court of general jurisdiction, which hears cases both in equity and at law
without regard to the amount in controversy in all non-criminal and non-
domestic relations cases.
Independent Variable: The independent variable was the "pending
motions" in the case. The level of measurement of the independent variable
was nominal: cases either had pending motions or they did not. There were
two attributes of cases with pending motions: cases in which the judge did
not rule on any of the motions and cases in which the judge ruled on some,
but not all of the motions. There were also two attributes of cases with no
pending motions: cases in which no motions were filed and cases in which
the judge ruled on all of the motions.
Dependent Variable: The dependent variable was "settlement in
mediation." The level of measurement of the dependent variable was
nominal: cases either settled or they did not settle. Partial settlements were
treated as no settlements.
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Operational Definitions: For the purpose of this research, a "motion"
was defined as any request for some form of relief other than the original
pleadings. Motions that pertained to issues of representation rather than to
issues of the case, such as attorneys' motions for leave of absence, motions to
withdraw as counsel, etc., were excluded.
The operational definition of a "pending" motion was any motion filed
before the mediation took place and was contested by the opposing party that
the court did not rule on the motion prior to mediation. Unopposed motions,
motions withdrawn before mediation, and motions in which the parties
consented to some form of relief, were excluded.
The operational definition of a "settlement in mediation" included cases
in which the parties, within 120 days of the last mediation session, signed a
written settlement agreement, announced to the court that a settlement had
been reached, agreed to the entry of a consent order, or voluntarily dismissed
their respective claims. This 120-day time frame was intended to capture
most of the settlements attributable to the mediation process and only applied
if there were no other court actions taken during that period.
Measures and Coding: The coders were third-year law students trained
by the Principal Investigator using the Codebook and Coder Training
Materials. Coder reliability was checked on three levels. First, the coders
were given lists of case numbers to research that had some case numbers in
common; the principal investigator compared the coding on the common
case numbers for consistency. Second, if the coding was inconsistent on any
file, the principal investigator coded that case and compared results with all
coder results for the same case. The coders discussed their coding decisions
with the goal of reaching consensus on proper coding. The principal
investigator made the ultimate decision as to proper coding. Lastly, the
principal investigator coded a random sample of the case numbers and
compared the results with the coder results. Any discrepancies were resolved
as stated above.
Procedures: Every document in every case file was examined to see
whether it met the operational definition of a "motion." Each motion was
then analyzed to see whether it met the operational definition of a "pending"
motion.
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B. Results
TABLE 1: Summary of Research Data
No Pending Motions Pending Motions Total
No All Some No
Motions Motions Motions Motions Total
Filed Ruled On Ruled On Ruled On
No Settlement 155 12 29 44 240
Settlement 456 50 5 12 523
Total 611 62 34 56 763
TABLE 2: Summary of Settlement Rates
(1) All cases mediated: 69%
(2) All cases in which motions were filed before mediation: 44%
(3) Cases with no pending motions at the time of mediation: 75%
a. No motions filed: 75%
b. All motions ruled on: 81%
(4) Cases with pending motions at the time of mediation: 19%
a. Some motions ruled on: 15%
b. No motions ruled on: 21%
There were 523 settlements in 763 total cases, for an overall settlement
rate of 69%. If there were no pending motions at the time of mediation, the
settlement rate was 75%, but if pending motions were present, the settlement
rate was only 19%. Motions were filed before mediation in 152 cases, and
the overall settlement rate for these cases was 44%. If the court ruled on all
of the motions before mediation, the settlement rate then jumped to 81%. If
the court did not rule on any of the motions, the settlement rate dropped to
21%, and if the court ruled on some but not all of the motions, the settlement
rate dropped again to 15%.
While these data appear to support the hypothesis, there is the possibility
that the results just happen to coincide with the hypothesis as a random
occurrence. In order to prove the hypothesis, the data must be analyzed, and
the null hypothesis rejected.
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C. Data Analysis45
The hypothesis predicts that if the courts rule on pending motions before
mediation, settlement rates will be higher than if they do not rule on pending
motions. A necessary condition for this to be true is an inverse relationship
between pending motions and settlement in mediation. This relationship can
be observed by putting the research data in a chi-square contingency table, as
follows:
45 A binary logistic regression was performed using the PASW 18 statistical
software (formerly SPSS), in order to explore the relationship between pending motions
and settlements. This procedure was chosen to accommodate the dichotomous dependent
variable for settlements (yes = 1, no = 0). The independent variables in the regression
equation are also dichotomous (yes = 1, no = 0): (1) no motions filed; (2) all motions
ruled; (3) some motions ruled; and (4) no motions ruled. Due to the dichotomous nature
of the independent variables, one variable was excluded from the analysis to serve as the
condition against which the others were compared. For the purposes of this analysis, the
impact of (2) all motions ruled, (3) some motions ruled, and (4) no motions ruled will be
compared against cases in which (1) no motions were filed.
The results of the analysis reveals that, compared to cases in which no motions were
filed, cases in which some motions were ruled on were less likely to be settled (b = -.284,
odds ratio = .059, p<.001), and cases in which no motions were ruled on were less likely
to be settled (b = -2.38, odds ratio = .093, p<.001). Cases in which all motions were ruled
on were not statistically more or less likely to be settled than those in which no motions
were filed. Cases in which some motions were ruled on are almost seventeen times less
likely to be settled (1/odds ratio = 1/.059 = 16.95) than cases in which no motions were
filed, and cases in which no motions were ruled on are almost eleven times less likely to
be settled (1/odds ratio = 1/.093 = 10.75).
Logistic Regression Results
Independent Variables B SE B
All Motions Ruled 0.35 0.33
Some Motions Ruled -2.84 0.49"
No Motions Ruled -2.38 0.34...
Constant 1.08 0.09'
Dependent Variable: Settlement (1 = yes, 0 = no)
*p<.05, **p<.OJ, ***p<.Oo
The logistic regression supports the hypothesis and effectively rejects the null
hypothesis at the p<.001 level.
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TABLE 3
No Pending Pending Total
Motions Motions
No Settlement 167 73 240
Settlement 506 17 523
Total 673 90 763
An inverse relationship produces more settlements than no-settlements
when there are no pending motions and more no-settlements than settlements
when there are pending motions. Table 3 shows that settlements
outnumbered no-settlements 506 to 167 when there were no pending motions
and that no-settlements outnumbered settlements 73 to 17 when there were
pending motions. While there were far more cases with no pending motions
than cases with pending motions in the testing sample, each category
strongly indicates an inverse relationship between pending motions and
settlement in mediation.46
A comparison of settlement rates gives a more precise measure of the
association. A total of 763 cases completed mediation with 523 cases
reaching settlement, the baseline settlement rate for all cases mediated is
69%. The hypothesis predicts that the settlement rate for cases with no
pending motions will not only have a settlement rate higher than those
containing pending motions, but also the baseline. Cases with pending
motions should have a settlement rate lower than cases with no pending
motions and the baseline settlement rate.
Placing the research data in the settlement rate tables shows the
following:
46 The degree of association between two binary variables can be measured
statistically by calculating the phi coefficient. In this case:
(p= [(a) (d)-(b) (c)] / '/ [(e) (f) (g) (h)], where a=167, b=73, c=506, d=17, e=240,
f=-523, g=673, and h=90
o= [(167) (17)-(73) (506) / (240) (523) (673) (90)
(p= -34,099 / 87,193.73
(p= -. 391, indicating a medium (-.30) to strong (-.50) inverse relationship between
pending motions and settlement.
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TABLE 4
Cases with No Pending Motions
Number of Cases Settled in Mediation s s = 506
Number of Cases Mediated n n = 673
Settlement Rate % s/n = 75%
Cases with Pending Motions
Number of Cases Settled in Mediation s s = 17
Number of Cases Mediated n n = 90
Settlement Rate % s/n = 19%
As predicted by the hypothesis, cases in which there were no pending
motions had a settlement rate greater than the baseline: 75% compared to
69%. Similarly, cases in which there were pending motions had a settlement
rate much lower than the baseline: 19% compared to 69%. Comparing the
two groups directly shows a 75% settlement rate for cases with no pending
motions as opposed to a 19% settlement rate for cases with pending motions.
Cases with no pending motions were almost four times more likely to
settle in mediation than cases with pending motions. There are two situations
in which a case has no pending motions: (1) the court ruled on all the
motions, and (2) no motions were filed. The hypothesis predicts that cases in
which the court rules on pending motions are more likely to settle in
mediation than cases in which the court does not. The hypothesis specifically
refers to cases in which motions are filed before mediation and the court
makes a decision on whether to rule on those motions before sending the case
to mediation.
When the data are placed in a bi-variate cross tabulation table, it is clear
that a majority of the cases in this research had no pending motions because
no motions were ever filed.
TABLE 5
No Pending Motions Pending Motions Total
No All Some No
Motions Motions Motions Motions Total
Filed Ruled On Ruled On Ruled On
No Settlement 155 12 29 44 240
Settlement 456 50 5 12 523
Total 611 62 34 56 763
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There were 611 cases in which no motions were filed before mediation.
The settlement rate for these cases should be higher than the baseline of 69%
because none of the cases with pending motions fall within this category:
TABLE 6
Cases with No Motions Filed
Number of Cases Settled in Mediation s s = 456
Number of Cases Mediated n n = 611
Settlement Rate % s/n = 75%
This leaves 152 cases in which motions were filed before mediation.
These cases should have a lower settlement rate than the 69% baseline
because all of the cases with pending motions fall within this category:
TABLE 7
Cases with Motions Filed
Number of Cases Settled in Mediation s s = 67
Number of Cases Mediated n n = 152
Settlement Rate % s/n = 44%
This also establishes the baseline settlement rate of 44% for all cases in
which motions were filed before mediation.
The inverse relationship between pending motions and settlements must
also apply to the cases in which motions were filed before mediation. This
can once again be demonstrated with a chi-square association table:
TABLE 8
No Pending Pending Total
Motions Motions
No Settlement 12 73 85
Settlement 50 17 67
Total 62 90 152
Settlements outnumber no-settlements 50 to 12 when there are no
pending motions, and no settlements outnumber settlements 73 to 17 when
there are pending motions. This time, the hypothesis is supported by the
research data by a ratio of greater than 4 to 1.
When motions are filed before mediation, a case can have no pending
motions only if the court rules on all of the motions filed. By comparing the
settlement rate of cases with no pending motions to cases with pending
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motions, the effect of the court ruling on pending motions before mediation
can be measured.
TABLE 9
Cases with No Pending Motions
Number of Cases Settled in Mediation s s = 50
Number of Cases Mediated n n = 62
Settlement Rate % s/n = 81%
Cases with Pending Motions
Number of Cases Settled in Mediation s s = 17
Number of Cases Mediated n n = 90
Settlement Rate % s/n = 19%
As predicted by the hypothesis, cases in which there were no pending
motions had a settlement rate greater than the baseline: 81% compared to
44%. Similarly, cases in which there were pending motions had a settlement
rate much lower than the baseline: 19% compared to 44%. Once again, the
null hypothesis appears to be rejected.
The attributes of cases with pending motions are of some interest. A case
can have pending motions only if motions are filed and either the court rules
on some of the motions or none of the motions. Placing this data in a chi-
square association table shows:
TABLE 10
Some Motions No Motions Total
Ruled On Ruled On
No Settlement 29 44 73
Settlement 5 12 17
Total 34 56 90
The baseline settlement rate for cases with pending motions at the time
of mediation is 19%. The settlement rate for cases in which some, but not all,
motions were ruled on is 15%, and the settlement rate for cases in which no
motions were ruled on is 21%. While it has no bearing on the hypothesis, it is
interesting to note that settlement rates were better if the court ruled on none
of the motions than if the court ruled on some but left others pending.
696
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VI. MATCHING RESEARCH TO THEORY
The research results were consistent with the Coase Theorem and its
corollary. When the courts made an assignment of property rights by ruling
on the pending motions, settlement rates soared upward. When the courts did
not rule on all of the pending motions, settlement rates plummeted.
Interestingly, when the courts made an assignment of some property
rights but not others, the settlement rates were lower than if the court had
made no assignment at all. This result is consistent with mediation literature
that suggests that court-connected mediation will induce settlement only to
the extent that it clarifies risks and provides information about probable trial
outcomes.47 When the court rules on some, but not all motions, it sends
mixed signals to the parties. Each party views the situation in the most
favorable light. The party against whom the ruling was made will draw the
conclusion that there must be merit in the remaining issues or else the court
would have taken the opportunity to slam the lid on it. The party receiving
the favorable ruling will draw the conclusion that the court is on board with
the reasoning presented and' is very likely to continue to do so. Both parties
come away overly optimistic about the trial outcome and less willing to
negotiate on the remaining contested issues. From the perspective of the
Coase Theorem, transaction costs were aggravated, rather than mitigated.
VII. IMPLICATIONS
The research results have practical implications for all judges, lawyers,
and mediators associated with court-connected mediation programs. For
judges, the implication is simple: rule on the pending motions before stnding
cases to mediation. Individual cases may present overriding circumstances
that weigh against ruling on the motions before mediation, but all things
being equal, mediation is more likely to induce settlement when the motions
have been resolved. The logistic regression analysis of the data in this
research shows that cases sent to mediation with pending motions were about
eleven times less likely to settle in mediation than those in which there were
no pending motions. Any initial time saved by not ruling on motions was lost
when cases came back from mediation, not only to have those and
subsequent motions heard, but also to have the entire case tried. Plus, the
parties incurred the additional costs of mediation and suffered another delay
in obtaining justice.
47 Shavell, supra note 23, at 24-27.
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The implication for attorneys is also simple: when genuine issues exist,
file appropriate motions before mediation. Attorneys may try to save their
clients the cost of bringing and prosecuting motions by waiting until after
mediation to file them. After all, if the baseline settlement rate for cases in
which motions are filed is only 44%, while the settlement rate for cases in
which no motions are filed is 75%, why not wait? The problem with this
reasoning is the same that applies to the child who moves the hands on the
clock so that it will be time for the cartoons to come on television. Settlement
rates do not cause cases to settle; they just reflect the likelihood that a case
will settle under certain conditions. By not filing motions when genuine
issues exist, attorneys lose their best opportunity to maximize the likelihood
of settlement in mediation. After all, courts cannot rule on motions that are
not made.
By the same token, attorneys should not file motions before mediation
when genuine issues do not exist. It is not uncommon for some attorneys to
attempt to enhance their bargaining positions by filing numerous motions
shortly before mediation, knowing fully well that there is not enough time for
the court to rule on the motions before mediation. Perhaps this strategy
actually works once in a blue moon, but most likely, it will only work to
sabotage the mediation process. The difference in settlement rates between
cases in which no motions are pending at the time of mediation, 75%, and
cases in which motions are pending, 19%, strongly suggests that the filing of
motions just before mediation has an extremely negative impact on
mediation results. Rather than enhancing bargaining positions, unresolved
motions result in viable settlement options going unexplored, money being
left on the table, and valuable resources being wasted.
The implications for mediators are a bit more subtle. The first
implication: find out whether any motion has been filed. The entire dynamics
of a dispute changes when a party files a motion. The filing party now
operates from a position of entitlement. If a response is filed, the opposing
party also moves to a position of entitlement. From these respective
positions, it will be difficult for the parties to see a mutually beneficial
resolution because they will attempt to claim, rather than create value. Each
party will be unwilling to consider a resolution that requires a perceived
concession of valuable property rights, and each is likely to adopt a
competitive, rather than a collaborative or compromising, negotiation
strategy.
If the court rules on the motions, the entitlement issues are put to rest,
and the mediator can focus on helping the parties identify where their best
interests lie in light of the court's ruling. The mediator will need to be
prepared to deal with certain psychological transaction costs on both sides.
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For example, the prevailing party will want to negotiate from the perspective
of having been justified, and the losing party will want to negotiate from the
perspective of having been treated unfairly or perhaps from a need for
vindication. The mediation process has proven to be very effective in dealing
with these types of transaction costs, and it is certainly not surprising if
mediation settlement rates jump when cases are in this position. Experienced
mediators will help the parties reevaluate the risks involved in litigation,
redefine case value, explore the new probabilities of trial outcomes, narrow
the range of settlement negotiations, and move the parties to a less
competitive negotiation style.
If the court does not rule on the motions, the entitlement issue is still on
the table. The intensity of the dispute escalates and transaction costs increase
as the parties dig in to defend their positions. The likelihood of reaching a
mediated settlement drops precipitously before the mediation even begins.
By filing motions, the parties identify in advance the major barriers to
negotiation, giving the mediator an opportunity to devise a strategy to deal
with them. Strategies for dealing with overly optimistic parties and for reality
testing take high priority early in this type of mediation session, and
resolution options that go beyond the four corners of the motions need to be
explored to see whether there are mutually beneficial trade-offs to be made.
The second implication: find out whether either party plans to file
motions in the event that the case does not settle in mediation. The difference
in settlement rates between cases in which no motions were filed, 75%, and
cases in which the court ruled on all pending motions, 81%, indicates that
some parties in the research sample were probably holding some motions
back until after mediation. Too often, motions are not filed before mediation,
and parties mediate from a hidden agenda that creates invisible barriers to
settlement. The bargaining strategy employed by the party with a hidden
agenda may be more competitive than the situation appears to warrant and
may frustrate negotiations. An informed mediator can help bring the issues to
the surface.
Mediators need to know whether motions were filed, whether the court
ruled on any of them, and whether motions are anticipated to be filed if the
mediation fails to bring a resolution to the conflict. The strategy for
mediation will be different for each situation. The likelihood of settlement
increases when the mediator recognizes the types of transaction costs
involved and employs appropriate strategies to mitigate them.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
When motions are filed before mediation, courts are presented with a
golden opportunity to increase the overall effectiveness of court-connected
mediation. By ruling on motions before sending cases to mediation, the court
greatly increases the probability that the parties will be able to settle their
dispute in mediation without trial. Not only does this reduce the court's busy
calendar, but it saves time, money, and a good deal of anxiety for the parties.
Thinking back to Roscoe Pound and why court-connected mediation was
implemented in the first place, this is just too valuable an opportunity to pass
up. Every settlement in mediation represents a victory in the court of public
opinion.
